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THE TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITIES
LEsTER W. FEZER

While the cases on this subject are legion, as one judge says
in an opinion, the number of articles and notes discussing the
subject in the law reviews is small. This is probably due chiefly
to the fact that, while the courts are uncertain and divided to
this day as to the proper theory upon which to rest their conclusions, they are for the most part in accord as to the result
which should be reached. Ii is, therefore, the perhaps presumptuous purpose of this article to criticize this conclusion in certain
types of cases, even though it does represent the overwhelming
weight of authority.
The law on this topic can be and has been rather adequately
summarized in one short paragraph by Mr. Carl Zollman in an
He says:
article in the Michigan Law Review.'
"To sum up: a number of states have, following the
English dicta, exempted charities from all tort liability
against beneficiaries as well as others on the ground that
public policy demands that the trust fund be not diverted to
paying damages. The great majority of courts, however,
do justice to employees, strangers and invitees by holding
the charity to the same degree of care exacted from other

entities. In regard to beneficiaries they hold the charity
liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of the trustees or managers in selecting incompetent servants, but not
for the negligence of servants carefully selected."
This, the concluding paragraph of Mr. Zollman's article,
ends with the statement of the reason for this rule which Mr.
Zollman considers the most satisfactory among the many advanced in the numerous cases involving this question.
It is the theory of the present article that none of the reasons given for this immunity is satisfactory in the present day
'Damage Liability of Charbtale Istitutioms (1921)
395, 412.
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and age, that the rule is unjust, anti-social and unsuited to modern
conditions, and finally, that it should be abandoned. If this cannot be accomplished by decision, because of the innate conservatism of the courts, or because of the force of the principle of
stare declsi , it should be the subject of legislation.
The writer believes that, from the view point of social justice, and in harmony with legal development in other questions,
particularly in the law of torts, this rule belongs with the fellowservant rule and other legal doctrines of that period, which have
been largely abandoned, and that it deserves the same fate.
This immunity of charities from liability to their beneficiaries is one of several immunities from liability which remain
in the law of torts as the modern heritage of the Georgian and
Victorian period of English jurisprudence, in which property
and the rights arising out of property were the favorites of the
law. It is a remnant of that Old England, whose legal institutions and concepts are now shaking off that rigidity of form
which was given them by the class-conscious thought of the
bench, bar and legislature, which ruled England and formed the
pattern for both English and American legal development until
approximately the beginning of the present century. This earlier point of view is slowly but surely yielding to the influences
of more general education, wide" suffrage, the invasion of the
bar and bench by recruits from the previously excluded social
classes, and the development in all classes of society of the "social consciousness," that is, the consciousness that society owes
to personality a degree of protection at least equal to that which
2
it has so long accorded to property.
It is perhaps superfluous to point out that the past developments in American law along this line are the natural result of
the established regard of the American legal profession for English precedents, and for the usually excellent reasoning of the
English opinions. This criticism of the rule under discussion is
in no sense meant to indicate dissatisfaction with the judges who
'Pound, Interests of Persoiwlity (915) 28 HAv. L. Rav. 343, 445, which
.points out that in securing individual interests inpersonality, the lawr is securing a
social interest.
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worked out initially the theories for dealing with such problems.
The judges of that day;- as well as the rules of law they worked
out, were the natural and probably the inevitable product of the
times. But today, so greatly have social concepts changed as to
society's duty to the individual that the law must inevitably incorporate these changing mores into legal rules.
The fact that the writer of a law review article believes
the law should be otherwise than it is upon a particular legal
problem may probably be regarded as an insufficient argument for
the conclusion thus reached. The position here taken, that charities, whether they be corporations, trusts, or other forms of legal
entity,3 should be liable, to the same extent as other employers,
to pay damages for torts committed through the negligence of
their employees, is no exception. In short it requires proof. It
will probably be impossible to prove this contention to the satisfaction of the courts in a jurisdiction having precedents denying
this liability. It will also be at least difficult to prove it to courts
in states having no decisions upon the subject either way. If this
view should come to prevail in any length of time short of several generations, it is probable that legislation would be necessary.
Now what are some of the points in favor of doing away
with the immunity of charities? With the authority as it is, the
arguments must obviously be put upon other grounds. Suppose one tries to think of this problem in terms of that abstraction called justice. What is justice in the present connection?
Indeed, what is justice in any connection? Justinian defined it
as the disposition to give every man his due. But the law, the
customs, the sanctions of the particular time and place where an
event occurs, must determine what is every man's due in reference to that event. Is it more just today that a patient, an inmate, or any other beneficiary of a charitable institution, whether
supported by the endowment of one wealthy philanthropist or
by the gifts of many persons, should be allowed to recover damages against the intending benefactor, or that the loss or suffer'As to what is a charity see Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 219 Il. 38r,
75 N. E. g9r (9os), :2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 556 (igo6); Note (1888) I L. P. A.
417; II C. J. 303, n. 64.
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ing to the individual should rest where it falls? 4 There are conflicting appeals to justice here, as in every case where one of two
innocent persons must suffer in some manner from the consequences of another's malice, carelessness, or folly. It is admitted
by the decisions that the charity is liable where its managers have
committed the wrong of hiring an incompetent servant, and that
servant has been guilty of the act which has produced the injury. In the type of case which raises the present problem the
defendant itself has done no wrong per se. The defendant has
set in motion another agency. The circumstances are such that
the ordinary individual or corporation as master would be liable.
The question simply is: does the doctrine of respondeat superior
apply to this situation? One of the cases denying recovery says
that the doctrine of respondeat sitperior is a harsh one and
should be restricted.5 Justice is too often a question of conflicting rights, and we cannot always apply the convenient, if sometimes pragmatic, rule, so often resorted to in commercial or
property questions, when a third party has dissipated value or
wealth under circumstances such that one of two innocents rriust
lose. That is, we cannot dispose of a personal injury by saying
that the legal title shall prevail.
Here then is a question of justice between the two parties
most directly affected. But the claims of both upon the favor
of justice are subject to the rights and welfare of society, and
also subservient to the interests of that government in whose
name and by whose machinery justice must be determined and
Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, x75 N. W.
699 (2o).
This ease is quoted in this connection at p. 209 of this article.
Contra: Bachman v. Y. W. C. A., iy9 Wis. 178, x9i N. W. 751 (1923). The
dissenting opinion says, at 186, 191 N. W. at 754: "What reason is there for
immunizing an association of this kind on account of the negligence of its servants, and placing the entire consequences of an injury upon an innocent third
person or upon the family of such injured person . . .? For an association like the defendant to claim immunity from the negligence of its servants
is like a minister of the gospel pleading the statutes of limitations to avoid
the payment of a just obligation. I think it is wrong in principle, is not
in accordance with the prevailing doctrine in this country, and is not conducive
to human welfare, and should not receive the sanction of this court." It should
be noted however that the case was one in which a third party, and not a
beneficiary, was suing the charity.
I Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, i2o Pa. 624, 15 At. 553, 1 L. R. A. 417 (x888);
Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595 (z895).
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administered. What does this mean, but that the question must
be settled by reference to social policy and in no other way? The
law has its rules and its principles of legal policy, and will answer
the questions put to it in terms of the policy of the law. Now
what makes the policy of the law what-it happens to be, in this
or any other case, rather than just the contrary? Legal policy
is but a reflection of a detail from the total ensemble of social
policy. However, the law does not reflect social policy instantaneously as a mirror reflects the image of an object placed before it. Only after the waves or emanations from a particular
manifestation of social conduct have shown upon the film of the
law for some time does it absorb enough of the rays to produce
a visible image. In other words, there must be a time exposure
before the image of changed social phenomena and correspondingly changed social requirements become fixed in the law, just
as is required by a photographic film which is exposed in a dimly
lighted place. It would therefore seem that when society is sure
enough of what it wants, and when that certainty has persisted
for a sufficiently long time, the thing will ultimately come to pass.
Why is it just, at the present day, to hold charities liable in
the type of situation here under discussion? It is submitted that
the imposition of liability in such cases is justice now, even if it
were not always so. This is so now because it has at this point
in our social progress become evident that social policy, to be
consistent with its development as a whole, must be interpreted
as calling for the imposition. of liability in such cases. The charity of' times gone by, to the extent that it then existed, was a very
different thing from the modern charity. Charity has become
organized. Formerly, except as' it was a part and creature of
the Church, it was not organized at all, and depended upon the
humane instincts of individuals or small informal groups. Some
of the decisions, evidently influenced in part at least by this conception, have said that the Good Samaritan must not be discouraged by being mulcted in damages; yet as a private individual
he would be held liable. The volunteer who does a job negligently is everywhere held liable. The courts do not even seem
to stick at applying to him the doctrine of respondeatsteperior.As
stated in a note in the American Law Reports:
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"An individual is absolutely bound to make compensation for any injury negligently inflicted upon a stranger in
the performance of any act which he undertakes, and the
fact that he is actuated by a. charitable motive is immaterial.
. The fact that he attempts to delegate performance of
the undertaking to another is immaterial, for qui facit per
alium, facit per se." C
The modem institution which is the usual defendant in these
cases does not do charity in the manner of the Good Samaritan of
old. It is a thing of steel and stone and electricity, of boards and
committees, of card indices and filing systems, and of rules and
regulations. The beneficiary, theoretically, may take its aid or
leave it; practically, he must take it or perish. While it is true
that he should be thankful for what society offers him of help
and comfort through such agencies, it is society's real and ultimate purpose that he shall be bettered in mind, body and estate
by what it does for him. Another result which should be sought,
and undoubtedly is intended by our modem institutionalized relief of the socially-handicapped, is the shifting of the loss, at least
partially, from the unfortunate victim of the injury to society.
For example, if a crippled child be placed for treatment and correction of his deformity, in a hospital maintained by charity,
the social object is twofold: first, that he shall not go through a
life of unnecessary and preventable suffering, physical and mental; and second, that he shall not be a burden upon society as a
pauper, but shall be placed as nearly as possible upon a parity
with his fellows, in order that he may make a contribution to the
economic life of the community instead of being a drain upon
I Note (1921) i4 A. L. R. 573. For a general discussion see Bohlen, Moral
Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (i908) 56 U. oF PA. L. REv.
217, 3z6.
"In Hoke v. Glenn, x67 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 8o7 (1914), although recovery
was allowed only because the charity was found negligent in employing an incompetent person, the court said, at 597, 83 S. E. at 8og: "The beneficiaries of
charitable institutions are the poor, who have very little opportunity for selection, and it is the purpose of the founders to give to them skillful and humane
treatment. If they are permitted to employ those who are incompetent and unskilled, funds bestowed for beneficence are diverted from their true purpose,
.and, under the form of a charity, they become a menace to those for whose
benefit they are established."
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it.s If the institution, through negligent injury to him, prevents
the fulfillment of either of these objects, it has in that case and
to that extent defeated the purpose for -which it was created.
Laying aside the loss and suffering of the individual, the institution whose negligent servant injures an inmate so that his economic value to society is reduced, has failed in its duty to society
and to the members of society who have established and maintained it.
This thought, that the charity which has negligently injured
a beneficiary,9 defeats its purpose, has been suggested in some
judicial opinions, but this type of reasoning is usually based
upon considerations referring to the individual welfare of the
beneficiary involved. The judiciary has, so far as may be inferred from the cases discovered in this study, generally failed
to recognize the obligation -which charity, according to the theory
of modern sociology, owes to society, and which it shifts to other
shoulders if it be immune from liability for negligent injury to
its beneficiaries. This may be due to historical causes arising
out of the religious and public origin of charitable institutions.
As has been stated, the immunity extends only to institutionalized
charity and not to the individual Good Samaritan. The doctrine
has been long established that public institutions, with two exceptions, viz., the maintenance of public highways and the performance of non-governmental functions, are not liable in tort.
The functions performed by charities, when they are carried on
by the government or its local subdivisions, are of the sort clearly
recognized as governmental functions. The king could do no
wrong, hence government is not liable for tort.10 Charity began
I As an indication of the fact that the right of the child to equality of
opportunity has become a prominent item in the social consciousness of today,
it may be recalled that it was emphasized by Mr. Hoover in his address of
Aug. Iz, 1928, accepting the Republican nomination for the presidency.
I Supra notes 3 and 7.
"'The immunity of municipalities from tort liability is also under fire. See
Borchard, Gozentment Liability In Tort (1924-27) 34 YALE L. J. I, 129, 229%
36 ibid. 1, 757, 1039. There are two recent cases in Oklahoma holding that a
city may be held liable in tort for negligent injury to patients in a city hospital.
City of Shawnee v. Roush, 1oI Okla. 6o, 23 Pac. 354 (ig24); City of Pawhuska v. Black, 157 Okla. so, 244 Pac. X114 (1926). The Oklahoma court
takes the position that in running a hospital at which paying patients are accepted, it is acting in a quasi-private matter. However, this conception of a
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when the Church and State were one and likewise the Church
could do no wrong. Therefore charities, which were in earlier
times regarded as works of piety, established and maintained for
the welfare of the souls of the benefactors, could not be guilty of
wrong, particularly for the wrongs of employees selected with
reasonable care and in good faith. Indeed one can read between
the lines of some of the opinions relating to charities and charitable trusts, not only in tort cases but in other connections, the
suggestion that the judges were more concerned with the souls of
the creators of charitable trusts than with the bodies of their beneficiaries."
In the arguments thus far presented in this paper no attempt has been made to state or classify the cases involved. Decisions are almost altogether against the thesis herein contended
for. The decisions in three states which have held in favor of
the beneficiary of a charity have not apparently had any substantial influence upon other jurisdictions, and in one of these three
states the legislature by statutory enactment has forbidden the
further application of this point of view.' 2 It remains to take up
briefly the authorities as they show the development of this field
city hospital as private is not generally supported by authority. Also the
fact that the plaintiff in a particular case is a paying patient does not seem to
the present writer as extremely important, inasmuch as the cases exempting
hospitals from liability do not make a distinction on this ground. These decisions are in line with an increasing tendency in a number of states to hold
municipalities liable in tort even in connection with their governmental functions. (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 316, 322, commenting on the first of the Oklahoma
cases, says: "The Oklahoma case, mtpra, imposes the responsibility of any profit
making corporation. This, it is submitted, best serves the welfare of society.
The modem tendency, through various forms of insurance-fire, accident, life,
workmen's compensation acts, and the like . . . is to shift the burden from
the innocent victim to the community."
'As to the suggestion that the imposition of tort liability upon charities
will tend to discourage donors from founding and maintaining them, it is said
in (x925) 34 Y.4z L. J. 316, 322: "The cases that adopt rules relieving
charitable corporations from responsibility, wholly or in part, indicate the
fear that any other policy will result in the disappearance of charities through
the failure of donations and the dissipation of funds. Even if some reason
for fear be admitted, a distinction should be drawn between private charities
and those created and supported by the state. The public charity has the
taxing power of the state to support it. In England, Canada, and those
states where absolute responsibility is imposed, these fears have hardly been
realized. . . . The cases sentimentalize much about the unfairness of subjecting the 'Good Samaritan' to an action for damages. The alternative
is that those must suffer whom the charities were designed to benefit."
'iR I. GEN. LAws (1923) §3561.
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of the law, and to analyze somewhat the various theories on
which the immunity of charities in tort actions has been based in
the decisions of the courts.13
TH- TRusT-FuN

THEORY

Some of the cases have said that the fund created by the
benefactors of the charity would be diverted from the purpose
for which it was set apart, if it should be employed to pay damages for injuries caused by the employees of the charity. This
theory has been used as a way of explaining why a beneficiary
of the charity should not recover, but its soundness has been
tested in a number of cases involving various aspects of the general proposition, with the result that it has been repudiated by
the majority of jurisdictions. If this theory be sound, a charity
could not be held liable in tort to any plaintiff, so far as trust
funds might be necessary to discharge the liability. On the other
hand, if the charity has in hand income derived from other
sources, as, for example, from fees collected from paying patients, then this theory should not prevent recovery even by a

plaintiff who is a beneficiary of the charity, so long as his judgment is satisfied from such funds.
The weakness of the trust-fund theory has become appa-

rent by reason of the refusal of the courts to apply it, in the
majority of jurisdictions, against persons other than the beneficiaries of the charity. Where the plaintiff is a stranger to the
charity, the weight of authority today is that he may recover.1 4
'1For a very complete collection of authorities adopting the various
theories upon which this doctrine of non-liability of charities is rested, see
Note (92i) 14 A. L. R. 573; (1925) 34 YATx L. J. 316; (Ip24) 72 U. oF PA.
L. REV. 443.

",Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. igr, 96 N. E. 406,
38 L. R..
A. (N. S.) 481 (iguI) (plaintiff injured by ambulance negligently driven
on the highway) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Aft. i2O, 42 L. R.A.
(T. s.) I44 (912) (plaintiff injured by vehicle of defendant due to negligent
driving by defendant's servant). This case has the effect of making it clear
that the Rhode Island statute referred to, stpre note 12, is limited to beneficaries. Many earlier cases putting their decisions on the trust-fund theory
have been narrowed by the later refusal of the courts deciding them to deny
liability to outsiders or even to employees. But a few recent cases have gone
the length of holding that a charity owes no liability to outsiders. Bachman v.
Y. W. C. A., supra note 4; Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hosp., 246 Mass. 363,
141 N. E. 113 (x923) ; (1924) 22 Mica. L. REv. 259; (1925) 34 YAm L. J.
3x9, n. o.
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Similarly, where the plaintiff is an employee of the institution, 15
the weight of authority holds the charity liable, and where the
plaintiff is an invitee '6 coming for a business or social purpose,
connected either with the charity itself or with. an inmate, it is
generally held that the institution is liable to him, quite on the
same basis as if it were a private individual or corporation.
It is likewise held- by the majority of jurisdictions that the
exemption of charities from liability to beneficiaries applies only
to those cases in which the charity (viz., the managers or trustees) has used due care in the selection of the employees whose
negligence later causes the injury complained of.1 7

However,

Massachusetts, one of the jurisdictions most consistent in applying the trust-fund theory, has also declared in this class of cases
that there is no distinction between the liability of a charity as
an employer for the negligence of its servants in the course of
their employment, and for its own negligence in selecting incompetent servants.' s That is, the charity is liable in Massachusetts
in neither case. This extreme position, contrary to the weight
'Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 141 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907);
Hewitt v. Women's Hosp. Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 64 AtI. 19o (io6); see
Thomas v. German Benevolent Ass'n, 168 Cal. 183, 141 Pac. ix86 (1914).
CoL ra: Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855 (I9o6). In Massachusetts the strict application of the trust-fund theory exempts charities from
the operation of the Workman's Compensation Act. Zoulalian v. New England Sanatarium Ass'n, 23o Mass. io2, =19 N. E. 686 (i98); Whittaker v.
St. Luke's Hosp., 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189 (i9og).
"Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp., ioz Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208 (1918)
(physician called in by hospital patient for specific services) ; Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (191o) (mechanic coming on the
premises as invitee of the defendant institution to make repairs); Hospital of
St. Vincent v. Thompson, i16 Va. io, 8i S. E. 13 (914) (friend who brought
patient into the hospital held entitled to, have the premises in a safe condition).
Contra: Loeffler v. Shepard & B. P. Hosp., 13o Md. 265, ioo At!. 3oi (1917) ;
Benton v. City Hosp., 140 Mass. 13, I N. E. 836 (1885) (where plaintiff came
on implied invitation to remove patient ready for discharge).
'Zollman, supra note i, at 403, n. 63; Note (I92I) 14 A. L. R. 573, 599;
Ii C. J. 375, n. 97. There are a number of states in which are found decisions denying recovery ostensibly for the reason that due care was used
in the selection of the servant whose negligence is the cause of the complaint,
but which at the same time have cases asserting the theory of complete immunity.
. In Tribble v. Sisters of the Sacred Heart, T37 Wash. 326, 242 Pac. 372
(x926), the plaintiff, while still under an anaesthetic; was burned by means of a
hot-water bottle negligently left in the bed by a probationer, and it was left
to the jury to determine whether the institution was guilty of negligence in
-the selection of the probationer. In a jurisdiction where liability turns upon
this point, it would seem correct to treat it as a jury question.
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of authority, was taken by the Massachusetts court when the precise question -came before it in x92o,19 notwithstanding its earlier dictum in McDonald v. Mass. G nerat Hosp.,20 said to be the
first American case involiing the liability of charities for tort.
The dictum was expressed as follows:
"The liability of the defendant corporation can extend
no further than this; if there has been no neglect on the part
of those who administer the trust and control its management, and if due care has been used by them in the selection
of their inferior agents, even if injury has occurred by the
negligence of such agents, it cannot be made responsible."
If the trust-fund theory is the proper explanation of this
immunity of charities from tort liability, it should in all consistency result in their freedom from liability arising from any
injuries in connection with the property in which the trust fund
is invested, whether for the primary purpose of the charity, or
merely for income. However, it is recognized, even in Massachusetts, that the defendant charity will be held liable 2 1 in such
22
cases.
9Roosen

v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp.,

z4 A. L. R. s63 (9zi).
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Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392

(I92O),

2I20 Mass. 432, 436 (i8y6).
"Holder v. Mass. Horticulural Soc., 211 Mass. 370, 97 N. E. 63o (1912).
The plaintiff, an employee of the defendan4 was injured by a defective elevator in a part of the building which was leased by the defendant to tenants,
and not used for any purpose connected with the charity. It was held that
the defendant was liable. The court said that the fact that the rent was applied to the general charitable purposes of the society was wholly immaterial.
To the same effect see Stewart v. Harvard College, 12 Allen 58 (Mass. 1866).
In Winnemore v. Philadelphia, i8 Pa. Super. 625 (i9o2), property had been
left by Stephen Girard to be invested in a building, and the income was to be
applied to Girard College. The plaintiff was an employee of a tenant in this
building and was injured through the negligence of the elevator operator.
The court held that the charitable trust was liable. And in Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 20 S. W. 5io (1917), the plaintiff's intestate was
a lawyer who was a tenant in a building owned by the defendant. iHe was
killed by the fall of a defective elevator. The building housed the law school
of the defendant, but was chiefly rented out for offices. It was held that the
trust-fund doctrine, in which the court reaffirmed its faith, could not be extended to relieve the revenues from the invested funds from liability for negligence. The court did not have to decide whether the principal of trust funds
could be employed to pay such a judgment, but intimated that it could not.
I It should be noted that a charity, even though it be a governmental agency,
is liable for nuisance. City of Paducah v. Allen, Iii Ky. 361, 63 S. W. ;
(ig9o); Love v. Nashville Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S. W. 304 (1921);
ZolIman, supra note 1, at 399. Also where a duty is cast directly upon the
charity itself by statute, it is in some places held that the auty cannot be dele-
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THE WAIVER THEORY

Another theory which has come to be the favorite one in
what is probably the majority of the jurisdictions denying liability to beneficiaries, is usually referred to as the waiver theory.
This theory became prominent in i9oI 2S, when a federal court,
having occasion to examine the question, found the more general
statements as to the impropriety of depleting trust funds, the inapplicability of respondeat superior, and "public policy," unsatisfactory to explain the cases and reconcile them as they then
existed, and so it declared that persons seeking the services of a
hospital agreed to waive any right to hold it liable for injuries.
This theory in its turn has been criticized in a number of cases.
The Tennessee court,2 4 after indicating its disposition to adhere
to the trust-fund theory, says:
"There are cases from time to time occurring, and not
altogether infrequent, to which it is, as it seems to us, impossible to apply it-patients conveyed to hospitals in a demented condition, persons temporarily unconscious from injuries and who require immediate surgical and other attention, those who are so debilitated by diseases as to have no
power of understanding the terms of a contract, children too
young to understand the meaning of a contract, or to make
or be bound by one in any form, or even to understand the
nature of the work to be done for them. How can such
persons be held to waive a right of action which the law
gives to them? How can they be held to have agreed to an
exemption? Manifestly the only sound theory is that of an
exemption based on public policy."
In other words, it seems to be the conviction of this court
that the beneficiary does not waive a right of action because, for
reasons of public policy, he never had one.
gated, and hence liability will be imposed because it does not then depend upon
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior. II C. J. 376. See infra note 43.
'Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hosp., iog Fed. 294 (C. C. A. ist,
i9oz). There are cases based on this theory in a number of states. It formerly
prevailed in New York but has apparently been abandoned there. See
infra p. 204.
ClGamnble v. Vanderbilt Univ., supra note 21, at 629, 200 S. W. at 52. See
also McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied it; New York to Quasi-Public
-andEleemosynary Corporations (192o) 6 CoiN. L. Q. 56, criticizing the waiver

theory.
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Mr. Zollman in his article 2 puts his criticism of this theory
as follows:
"The objection to this theory is that it does violence to
the-facts, 'A patient entirely unskilled in legal principles, his
body racked with pain, his mind distorted with fever, is
held to know, by intuition, the principle of law that the
courts after years of travail have at last produced.' "26
It seems that another criticism of the waiver theory exists,
in that many courts adopting it make no distinction between pay
patients and free patients in the application of this line of reasoning. The pay patient has not received the consideration of
free service to support such a waiver upon the theory of contract.27

So it seems that whatever theory is adopted as a basis for
exempting charities from tort liability, if the exemption be con-

fined to beneficiaries, as in the general rule, it becomes necessary
to define this term. 28 In the determination of this point the weak-

ness of the waiver theory becomes especially apparent.
Running through the cases adopting one theory or another

are various statements to the effect that respoudeat superior does
not apply as against a charity, because that theory is intended
only to support recovery of damages against a defendant who
will receive, or who at least expects to -receive, financial benefit
from the transaction in which the delinquent agent is engaged
when the event occurs which is the basis of the action.2 9
"5Supra note i, at 399.
I This is quoted by Mr. Zollman from the dissenting opinion in Lindler v.
Columbia Hosp., infra note 32.
-'Cf.Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (igr8). For
the citation of other cases which deal with the question, whether the injury
may be regarded as arising from the breach of a contractual duty rather than
from tort, see Note (1925) 34 YALr, L. J. 321, n.21; also case note to the Minnesota case imposing liability, mcpra note 4, in (192o) i8 MicH. L. REV.539.
'As to who is a beneficiary see an excellent note in (x92) 8 CoRN. L. Q.
146, 148, in which, after reviewing a number of cases, it is stated: "Thus
it is seen that it is not because of a well established meaning of the word
'beneficiary,' that liability or nonliability of a charitable institution is determined
as a legal conclusion, but, on the other hand, it is apparent that the significance
of the word is the offspring of the policy adopted, and that its meaning is
determined by the extent to which the doctrine of exempting charitable institutions from liability is adopted."
I Note (zgio) 58 U. oF PA.L. Ray. 4a6 (this point is amplified).
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TaF-NEW YoRK THEoRy
The most recently devised theory for the explanation of this
immunity from tort liability comes from New York, and is in
a sense a special application of the general principle of respondeat
superior. It is as a proponent of this theory that Mr. Zollman
writes the article already referred to in the Michigan Law Review. He states it as follows:
"The doctrine of qualified immunity where no negligence appears in the selection or retention of agents or
servants can properly and logically be rested in most cases
upon the theory that the physicians and surgeons in attendance upon patients in hospitals or the nurses who are under
their direction are not the servants of the hospital in the
true sense because as to the nature and manner of their
service they are not under the direction of the defendant,
but that thev become and remain the servants of the patient
as long as they are in attendance upon him and that hence
the charity has performed its full duty when it has exercised due care in the selection of competent persons for such
service." 0
The following statement from the opinion in the New York
case which is a leading exponent of this theory presents it as follows: 31
"A hospital opens its doors without discrimination to all
who seek its aid. It gathers in its wards a company of skilled
physicians and trained nurses, and places their services at
the call of the afflicted, without scrutiny of the character or
the worth of those who appeal to it, looking at nothing and
caring for nothing beyond the fact of their affliction. In
this beneficent work, it does not subject itself to liability for
damages though the ministers of healing whom it has selected have proved unfaithful to their trust."
S-upra note I, at 407.
' Schloendorff v. New York Hosp. Soc., 211 N. Y. 125, 135, io8 N. E.
92, 95, 52 L. R. A. (.
s.) 505 (914), 37 Ann. Cas. 58r (i915). This

doctrine was reaffirmed by the Nev York Court of Appeals in Phillips v.
Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N. Y. x88, 146 N. E. X99 (19z4); a case where
the plaintiff was a paying patient and where the negligent servant was an
orderly employed by the hospital. The effect of such a case seems to indicate
that the result is reached simply because it is against the policy of the State
of New York to allow recovery by beneficiaries, and yet the court finds difficulties in the way of a general application of the trust-fund theory.

TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITIES

Do not the criticisms of the waiver theory apply similarly
to this New York theory, at least where it ii applied as a general
explanation of non-liability to all beneficiaries? The logic of this
theory is reasonable enough as applied to a pay patient in a hospital who is permitted to summon his own physician to attend
him, and who pays the physician directly for his services. He
cannot expect to hold the institution liable for the negligence of
a physician who stands in such relation to him. The same applies to the patient who is injured by the negligence of a special
nurse devoting her time solely to his care. However, as Mr.
Zollman says of the waiver theory, "It does violence to the facts"
to say that a patient who is attended by those physicians or nurses
who may be sent to do so by the institution in accordance with
its own rules, and who has no financial relation with these members of the staff, has impliedly selected them as his own.
The statements from Lindler v. Cohtmbia Hosp. - and
from Gamble v.Vanderbilt Uiv.,3 3 with reference to the waiver
theory, may likewise be made of the argument that the inmate
impliedly designates the institution's staff as his own agents,
and must look solely and directly to them in case of injury
through their negligence. The beneficiary is the raison d'etre of
the charity, but he may become the victim of the system and of
its rules. He has no voice, directly or indirectly, in the selection
of any of the persons who serve him, except in the case of a pay
patient in a private hospital who selects and pays his own physician and special nurse. Suppose the beneficiary is injured by
unwholesome food prepared in the general kitchens, whether
served by staff nurses or by his own special nurse. Or suppose
the elevator drops, either because of a defective mechanism which
the hospital carelessly omitted to repair after learning of the danger, or because of reckless operation by the employee of the institution. Has the beneficiary designated the culpable employees
as his own, whether he be paying for his accommodations or not?
The above suggestions are perhaps couched in terms too limited,
in that they seem to contemplate a hospital patient as the in'8 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (994).
Zollman, supra note i, at 399.
'Supra note 2r.

The dissenting opinion is quoted by
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jured person. May we extend this New York theory to the
babies in a home for foundlings?
Another important point in connection with this theory is
the proposition that the states adopting it do recognize liability
for failure to use due care in selecting competent employees, thus
conceding, unconsciously perhaps, that the persons employed on
the staff of the institution are after all its employees rather than
34
those of the beneficiaries.
THE PtJELIc-PomcY THEORY

Hence, it is submitted that, after all, the only theory which
can consistently be. employed to support the principle of exemption from liability is that of public policy, and, that, in the last
analysis, public policy is the real reason why this exemption from
tort liability has been extended to charities in much the same
fashion that it pertains to municipal corporations.35 In fact
some cases have said that the exemption of the charity from liability should exist because it does a quasi-governmental work by
performing a function which the government must otherwise
undertake. The public-policy theory will explain both those cases
which deny all liability and those which deny liability only to
beneficiaries. It is then finally for the courts to interpret the
public policy of their own several jurisdictions in this regard.
THE POLICY FAVORING LIABILITY

It is again submitted that it is against the spirit of modern
social thought and practice to hold that a charitable institution
should not pay damages under the same circumstances as any
ISee Barr v. Children's Aid, ipo N. Y. Supp. 296 (ig2i).
3 Professor Borchard in his article, supra note io, at 249, says: "But
whatever justification the doctrine of immunity may have in respect to ordinary
charitable trusts-and it is submitted it has very little-none of the reasons prevail when the institution is owned or operated by the i-ity, which has the taxing
power to secure funds for the vindication of its responsibility for negligence and
therefore is in no danger of having its existence suddenly terminated." See Note
(xgi8) 31 HARv. L. REv. 479. The self-styled "thesis" with which Professor Borchard's article is concluded, (gz4) 34 YA.xz L. J. i, iag, 229, 258, serves,
almost without alteration, to express what this article is intended to bring
out vith reference to charities. Professor Borchard is of course dealing with
-municipal corporations and their similar immunity. Particularly apt is his
characterization of this immunity as "bad social engineering."
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other employer whose servant by his negligence has injured a
third party, even though such injured person be a beneficiary of
the charity. Professor Lyman P. Wilson, of Cornell University,
in the introductory notes in his new Casebook on Torts, makes a
statement which applies peculiarly to just the type of problem
which is the topic of the present discussion.
"The field of torts, then, includes those socially imposed (as distinguished from individually assumed) private duties, which, in the light of changing experience, it
seems necessary to assert in promoting the common welfare of society. The problem of recognition and enforcement of these duties has more and more come to be recognized as a problem of social desirability and less and less
a mere matter of arranging fixed rules into a definitely logical system. In any study of torts the emphasis must now
be placed upon the effort to determine which claims in
society are, in the light of growing experience and changing conditions, entitled to gain or keep recognition. No
rule or principle is too venerable to be criticised; each must.
be measured by the social values which it offers." so
By way of conclusion attention is called to the meager authority in favor of holding charities liable, even to beneficiaries,
for the torts of their carefully selected employees.
In Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp.,3 T the plaintiff lost-his arm
through the alleged negligence of the hospital interne in the
manner of treatment and in the failure to send for one of the
surgeons who was attached to the staff and who was available
upon call for the purpose of attending to cases for which he might
be needed. The plaintiff paid a small sum for board and hospital
attendance. It was held to be error to direct a verdict for the
defendant upon the ground that the defendant was a public
charity. It may fairly be said that in this case the court repudiates the doctrine that charities are not liable to beneficiaries for
torts committed by their employees. While of course not deciding that question, the court distinguishes the situation where
the injury complained of is due to the negligence of a physician
'WILSON,

CASES ON THE LA-W OF TORTS (1928).

I2 R. I. 41

(I88o).
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not actually employed by the charity, but simply serving upon its
staff without compensation as a volunteer for the purpose of
giving treatment to patients in the hospital, and compares this
situation to that of the individual who employs a physician to
attend a sick friend unable to afford the service himself. The
court also discusses the manner of paying such judgment as
might be rendered in a case like this, and, while indicating that
some of the property of the charity might not be subject to execution, says: 38 "We also understand that the doctrine is that
the corporate funds can be applied, notwithstanding the trust for
which they are held, because the liability is incurred in carrying
out the trusts and is incident to them." The suggestion in the
opinion, that if charities were to be immune from liability in such
cases, the immunity must be conferred by the legislature, was
seized upon at the very next session of the Rhode Island Legislature, a9 and the case is hence no longer law in that state.
The next American case to hold a charity liable to a beneficiary was Tscker v. Mobile Infirinary Ass'n, 4" decided in Alabama in 1915, by which time a large body of contrary authority
had been established, whereas there were but a few cases on this
point when the Rhode Island case was decided. In the Tiicker
case the plaintiff alleged that she was scalded by boiling water
through the negligence of a nurse employed by the defendant.
The plaintiff was a paying patient. The defendant had judgment on the pleadings and upon appeal by the plaintiff from a
nonsuit the judgment was reversed. In this case the court first
of all decided that it was immaterial whether the case be regarded as one of tort or of contract. It conceded that the weight
of authority would exempt the defendant from liability upon the
facts and said: 41 "But it sometimes happens that in order to
reach a safe harbor one must row against the current." The
court concluded that, as to a paying patient at least, a hospital
should not be exempt from liability for the torts of its servants,
merely because it derives no profit from its operations. the
'Ibid. 428.
"Supra note 12.
"'g Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
'Ibid. 6ox, 68 So. at 12.
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court expressly states that it is not to be understood as deciding
the case of a totally free patient whose situation was otherwise
the same. One member of the Alabama court dissented in this
case, basing his opinion upon the trust-fund theory.
In the case of Midliner v. Evan'gelischter Diakonniessenverei, 4 2 decided in Minnesota in i92o, we again find a court
denying the charity its traditional exemption from liability. In
this case a paying patient in the delirium of fever jumped from
a second-story window and was killed by the fall. Leaving him
unattended after his previous behavior in the same delirium was
considered sufficient evidence of negligence, and the issue was
whether the charity should be exempt from liability. Judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Minnesota already had a decision 43. to the effect that an
employee could recover against a charity' for injury to him,
caused by contact with machinery not guarded as required by
statute. The court in the Mulliner case said: 4 4 'Wedo not find
any satisfactory ground for distinction between liability for an
act or omission which disobeys a statute and one which disobeys a rule of the common law, and it is difficult for us to find
any just reason for distinction between liability to any. employee
and liability to a patient." The court criticizes the trust-fund
theory as well as the argument that it is contrary to public policy
to apply the principle of respondeat superiorto a charity.
While the plaintiff's decedent in this case was in fact a pay4 5
ing patient, the court nevertheless says:
but this may not be a controlling fact. We do not
believe that a policy of irresponsibility best subserves the
beneficent purposes for which the hospital is maintained. We
do not approve the public policy which would require the
widow and children of deceased, rather than the corporation
to suffer the loss incurred through the fault of the corporation's employees, or, in other words, which would compel
the persons damaged to contribute the amount of their loss
43
Supra note
3

4.

, Mclnery v. St. Luke's Hosp., x2 Minn. 1o, 141 N. W. 837 (1913) ; see
Mald v. St. Luke's Hosp., x22 Minn. 444, 142 N. W. 7o5 (x93).
" Supra note 4, at 396, 175 N. W. at 7oo.
"Supra note 4, at 397, 175 N. W. at 7o.
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to the purpose of even the most worthy corporation. We are
of the opinion that public policy does not favor exemption
from liability."
The Minnesota Supreme Court has very recently produced
another decision 4 6 in which a church is held liable to a member
who was injured by the falling of a defective piano, while he
was trying to move it in order to facilitate its use in connection
with a social function at the church. The court considered the
church society a charitable institution, and, after reviewing the
authorities, elected to reaffirm the stand it had taken in the Melliner case.
It was pointed out in the Michigan Law Review, relative to
the Midliner case, 41 that "the court used language broad enough
to include charity patients, but as that question was not before
the court, its remarks in this regard are simply dictum." The
above mentioned case note concludes: "Modem tendency seems
to lean toward basing the exemption upon the contractual relation which arises by reason of the giving and receiving of charity, and this, it is submitted, represents the correct logical basis
for the decisions."
Obviously this newest Minnesota case does not depend upon
the contractual relation above suggested. The plaintiff as a
member of the church was undoubtedly contributing something
to its financial resources in return for which he was doubtless
receiving the spiritual enrichment which he sought. But neither
party had necessarily any contractual relation to the other, and
indeed the cburt did not consider or refer to any such factor in
the situation.
There are two fairly recent dissenting opinions which may
be mentioned as indicating a feeling on the part of some members of the judiciary that, as the Minnesota court says, "Public
policy does not favor exemption from liability." In Bachmn
v. Y. W. C. A., 48 the dissenting judge does not even agree with
Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 219 N. W. 463 (Minn. 1928).
(z92o) 18 Micn. L. REv. 539, 541.
'Spra note 4; (1923) 21 MicH. L. REv. 698; (1923) z Wis. L. REv.
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the doctrine of immunity as against beneficiaries, although in the
particular case he was arguing against its extension by the Wisconsin court to strangers to the charity. Judge Doerffler says: 49
"Exemption from liability for negligence in cases of private institutions should be founded solely upon acts of the Legislature,
and such exemption is particularly a province of the Legislature."
He also points out that the legislature has exempted certain charities from taxation and "surely such exemptions would not have
50
been within the proper field of determination for the courts."
Similar thoughts about the social value of this immunity
policy were doubtless in the mind of the dissenting Judge Frazer
in the South Carolina court 1 when he wrote:
'We do not think it wise or safe to allow an institution
to exist with unlimited power to do evil and make that institution powerless to repair the evil because some good man
or woman has contributed a fund and intended thereby to
do good. . . . We think the courts ought to hold the fund,
first to repair the evil done by itself, because the purpose of
the trust is to do good, and not evil. We know a trust fund
cannot be diverted to a different purpose from that for
which it was created. That is established law and we want
to further the purpose of the trust. The purpose of the
trust is to relieve suffering, and to increase it, when, in the
administration of the trust, suffering is increased, the purpose fails. The courts that declare immunity are destroying
and not maintaining the trust."
Along the same line of thought is another comment from
the dissent in the Bachman case 5 2 mentioned above, which, it
would seem, cannot be denied if the law is really the social science we are coming to consider it. "The protection of life and
limb by organized society is of greater importance to mankind
" Supra note 4, at i85,

i9i N. W. at 754.

"At a later point in this opinion, spra note 4, at 187, 191 N. W. at 755,
it is said: "Charity, from the modem viewpoint is an attribute of justice, and

springs from the Christian doctrine of service to mankind, and is not only a
privilege, but a duty, at least in the moral sense."
I Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., supra note 32, at 39, 8i S. E. at 517.
'=Supranote 4, at i87, 1g1 N. W. at 755.
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than any species of charity, and it is superior to the rights of
property."
It has not been the purpose of this article to go into the
authorities bearing upon this topic of the tort liabilities of charities in those jurisdictions outside of the United States. The situation apparently is that charities are held liable in tort on the
same basis as other corporations in at least England and Canada.
Cases are collected in the various annotations and in a number of
the law review notes already mentioned herein.53
' See
R. 91 Canadian
(Ont.). case of Eek v. High River Municipal Hosp.,
1 D.theL.recent

[1926]

